Logic for Virtual Worlds

In the second half of "Two Dogmas", Quine argued that there could be empirical grounds to revise logic---at least in principle. Since then, the most (though still not very) popular proposal for what those empirical grounds might actually be has involved quantum mechanics. 

Still, most logicians seem to think that quantum mechanics does not give us good enough reason for revision. This paper considers and evaluates an alternative proposal for what those grounds might look like and the logic they would support: perhaps the experiences acquired in virtual reality give us reason to adopt an assessment-sensitive logic.

Gillian Russell is Professor of Philosophy at the ANU School of Philosophy and visiting Professorial Fellow at the Arché Research Center at the University of St Andrews in Scotland. Her research interests include (broadly) philosophy of logic and language and (more narrowly) the metaphysics and epistemology of logic, barriers to entailment (including Hume's Law), the analytic/synthetic distinction, anti-exceptionalism about logic, logic's (lack of) normativity, virtual reality, and social and political applications of theoretical work in the philosophy of logic and language, including feminist logic.