Inability and Permission

Consider the following questions: 

Obligation: If S is unable to X, is S obligated to X? 
Permission: If S is unable to X, is S permitted to X? 

Obligation has received a great deal of attention in ethics and allied fields. Many are convinced that it should receive a simple answer: always `no'. 

In this paper, Kyle focuses on Permission, a question which has received much less scrutiny. He considers two simple answers to Permission---always `no' and always `yes'---and show that, granted plausible background assumptions, they have significant implications for the theory of obligation, on the one hand, and the theory of ability, on the other. 

He then develops a more sophisticated answer on which the meaning of permission claims has a counterfactual aspect. Among other things, this theory reveals interesting connections between permission and counterfactuals, and sheds new light on the relationship between permission and obligation.

Kyle Blumberg is a Lecturer in Philosophy in the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies at the University of Melbourne. He has interests in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and philosophical logic.